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Financial crises that affected the stock markets in the Middle Eastern countries 
highlighted the importance of the financial reporting quality and the needs for 
financial reforms that can develop financial reporting system. Studies on financial 
reporting quality (FRQ) have been neglected in the Middle East region. Although in 
recent years many Middle Eastern countries have initiated western-style corporate 
governance (CG), little research has been attempted to assess the impact of improved 
CG reform on FRQ. The present study addresses these shortcomings by setting three 
objectives using a sample of non-financial firms listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange 
(Tadawul), the Abu Dhabi securities exchange (ADX), representing the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE),  and the Qatar stock exchange (QSE). The study employed five 
characteristics of the companies’ board of directors as measures; namely, Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) duality, presence of independent members of the board of 
directors, holding of multiple directorships, financial expertise of directors, and 
social title of directors, as well as two ownership characteristics; namely, directors’ 
ownership and institutional ownership. The first objective of this study is to 
investigate the impact of CG reform on FRQ. This which achieved by investigating 
the trends of FRQ before and after the introduction of CG reform, where an 
independent sample t-test was used to examine the differences between firms’ FRQ 
averages before and after the reform was introduced. The second objective is to 
investigate the effect of changes required in the composition of boards of directors 
and ownership structures on FRQ, using a regression model under fixed effects 
estimators. In order to measure the FRQ, the study adopted Working Capital 
Accruals quality (WCAQ) as the most appropriate measure to capture the 
transparency and reliability of the financial reporting. The third objective is to assess 
the moderation role of CG reform on the relationship between CG characteristics and 
FRQ, which was achieved through including interaction terms for the CG reform and 
the variables of interest.  
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The main findings of this study indicate that reform in CG was indeed associated 
with an improvement in FRQ in both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), but not in the Qatar sample. The result of test for the second objective 
indicated that characteristics of Saudi boards of directors and ownership structure can 
explain the variation of firms FRQ to a greater extent than those of UAE and Qatar 
governance principles. The study contributes to the theory by extending financial 
reporting quality and corporate governance reform in accounting. The implications of 
this study include; government regulators can use the findings of this study to 
evaluate CG frameworks in their respective countries; and policymakers, can gain a 
better understanding of the weaknesses and the strengths of recent CG reform in their 
countries. The findings suggested that Middle Eastern countries should develop their 
CG system based on the real needs of the local stock market in order to enhance their 
financial reporting systems. 
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Krisis kewangan yang melanda pasaran saham di negara-negara Timur Tengah 
menunjukkan akan pentingnya laporan kewangan yang berkualiti dan keperluan 
kepada pembaharuan kewangan yang mampu membangunkan sistem laporang 
kewangan yang berkesan. Kajian menunjukkan laporan kewangan yang berkualiti 
(financial reporting quality, FRQ) tidak diamalkan di rantau Timur Tengah. 
Walaupun mutakhir banyak negara-negara Timur Tengah telah mengamalkan tadbir 
urus korporat cara barat (corporate gorvenance, CG) , hanya sedikit dari kajian telah 
dijalankan bagi mengenal pasti kesan peningkatan CG  dalam pembaharuan FRQ. 
Penyelidikan terkini telah cuba untuk mengatasi kekurangan ini dengan 
menggariskan tiga objektif menggunakan satu sampel firma-firma bukan kewangan 
yang disenaraikan di Bursa Saham Saudi (Tadawul), Bursa Saham Abu Dhabi 
(ADX) dari Emiriah Arab Bersatu (UAE) dan Bursa Saham Qatar (QSE). 
Penyelidikan ini menggunakan lima ciri-ciri Lembaga Pengarah syarikat seperti 
langkah-langkat berikut; iaitu, pembahagian Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif (CEO), 
kehadiran anggota berkecuali dalam Lembaga Pengarah, pemegangan pelbagai 
jawatan pengarah, kepakaran kewangan pengarah dan gelaran social pengarah, serta 
dua ciri-ciri pemilikan; iaitu pemilikan pengarah dan pemilikan institusi. Objektif 
pertama penyelidikan ini ialah menyiasat kesan CG dalam pembaharuan FRQ. Ini 
boleh dicapai dengan menyiasat kecenderungan FRQ sebelum dan selepas 
pengenalan pembaharuan CG, di mana sebuah ujian sampel berkecuali digunakan 
dalam mengkaji perbezaan antara purata FRQ syarikat-syarikat sebelum dan selepas 
pembaharuan diperkenalkan. Objektif kedua pula ialah menyiasat kesan perubahan 
yang diperlukan dalam komposisi Lembaga Pengarah dan struktur pemilikan pada 
FRQ, menggunakan model regresi dibawah kesan pengganggar tetap. Untuk 
mengukur FRQ, penyelidikan menggunakan Modal Kerja Akruan Kualiti (Working 
Capital Accruals Quality, WCAQ) sebagai langkah paling sesuai untuk mendapatkan 
ketelusan dan kebolehpercayaan laporan kewangan. Manakala objektif ketiga ialah 
untuk menilai keserdehanaan peranan CG dan melakukan pembaharuan kepada 
hubungan ciri-ciri CG dan FRQ yang dicapai melalui termasuk istilah interaksi 
pembaharuan CG dan pembolehubah berkepentingan. Penemuan utama kajian ini 
menunjukkan bahawa pembaharuan CG sememangnya dikaitkan dengan peningkatan 
FRQ di kedua-dua negara iaitu Arab Saudi dan Emiriah Arab Bersatu (UAE), tetapi 
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tidak bagi sampel ketiga, iaitu Qatar. Hasil dari ujian bagi objektif kedua 
menunjukkan bahawa ciri-ciri Lembaga Pengarah dan sturktur pemilikan Arab Saudi 
dapat menjelaskan perubahan FRQ syarikat-syarikat ke tahap yang lebih besar 
daripada prinsip-prinsip tadbir urus di UAE dan Qatar. Kajian ini menyumbang 
kepada teori dengan lanjutan kauliti laporan kewangan dan pembaharuan tadbir urus 
korporat di dalam bidang perakaunan. Implikasi kajian ini termasuk; pengawal selia 
kerajaan boleh menggunakan hasil kajian ini untk menilai rangka kerja CG di negara 
masing-masing; dan pembuat dasar, boleh mendapatkan pemahaman yang lebih baik 
mengenai kelemahan dan kekuatan pembaharuan CG yang mutakhir di negara 
masing-masing. Hasil kajian mencadangkan bahawa negara-negara Timur Tengah 
perlu membangunkan sistem CG mereka berdasarkan keperluan sebenar pasaran 
saham tempatan dalam usaha meningkatkan sistem laporan kewangan mereka. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1  Introduction  
 
This study examined empirically the associations among Corporate Governance 
(CG) reform and Financial Reporting Quality (FRQ), with particular reference to the 
emerging Middle Eastern stock markets. This chapter presents the background to the 
study, followed by the problem statement of the study, the objectives of the research, 
the importance of the study, and concludes with a description of the structure and 
content of this thesis. 
 
 
1.2  Background of the Study 
 
In the past century, the notion of financial reporting has changed from a simple 
concept into a combination of very important practices that affect the interests of 
several parties who constitute the users of financial reports. Financial statements and 
the report of the external auditor can affect the decision process in business life, 
which can indirectly affect the interests of other stakeholders (Baker & Wallage, 
2000). Financial reporting quality demonstrates the accuracy level that can achieved 
by financial reports (FR) to deliver information to all of the firm’s stakeholders to 
clarify the firm’s transactions, and specifically its predictable cash flows (Biddle, 
Hilary & Verdi, 2009). This is in harmony with the first concept of the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement of Financial Accounting (1978), 
which states that the most important goal of financial reporting is to update present 
and potential investors with the needed information to guide their investment 
decisions and evaluate the predictable cash flows.  
 
 
Hence, the importance of financial reporting derives from its position as the vital 
basis of information for the process of decision-making. Investors decide whether (or 
not) to purchase stocks by analyzing the financial reports of firms. Gopalakrishnan 
(1994) and Beatty and Weber (2003) showed that creditors choose to loan and 
initiate contractual terms (such as interest rates) and to consider financial figures 
based on a company’s financial reports. Accounting reports are essential because 
capital markets behave asymmetrically (Fields, Lys & Vincent, 2001). Bradshaw 
(2004) posits that financial reporting is crucial in international capital movements 
and thus, accounting quality is of great concern. Bharath, Sunder and Sunder (2008) 
argued that poor accounting quality would make it hard to estimate a firm’s ability to 
repay debt and to pay dividends. In contrast, high earnings quality reduces financial 
information asymmetry by increasing investment efficiency (Verdi, 2006), and by 
making earnings more representative of future cash flows (García‐Teruel, Martinez‐
Solano & Sánchez‐Ballesta, 2009). 
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On the topic of a firm’s performance in the capital markets, Christie and Zimmerman 
(1994) showed that an accounting alternative is more effective once it significantly 
improves a company’s value, although it differs throughout industries and time. The 
recent global financial crisis that witnessed the falling of giant companies both in 
Europe and Asia increased awareness for investors to take into consideration the 
quality of financial statements produced by companies before making any decision 
about whether to invest or not. It is vital for investors to have a thorough analysis of 
the financial reporting of the potential company they seek to invest in. On the other 
hand, the financial crisis raised a fundamental question of corporate governance: that 
is, to what extent are managers able to provide better and qualitative financial 
reporting that can mitigate investors’ losses and improve their decisions? Corporate 
governance is considered to be a mechanism which helps improve several agency 
problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Separation of the owners and the management 
of a corporation may cause a conflict of interest, as managers are believed to be 
more likely to use a corporation’s resources for their own interest rather than the 
owner’s interest, thus leading to a waste of some resources by investing under 
uncertainty and with high risks. In order to remain in their positions longer, 
managers may manipulate financial reports to show that the corporation is sound 
while the reality on the ground is very different. Moreover, the CG as a concept 
focuses on the protection of the stakeholders by providing strong controlling and 
monitoring systems that can ensure a high level of the transparency and FRQ 
(Cadbury Committee, 1992; John & Senbet, 1998). In terms of CG interests, the 
enhancement of the financial reporting is one of the CG system’s main goals 
(Norwani, Mohamad & Chek, 2011). Both FRQ and CG systems interacted with 
each other to build a strong protection system that can be a central point for 
stakeholders. For example one of the main responsibilities of the board of directors 
as a CG mechanism is to guarantee the firm’s FRQ system. This system is expected 
to provide stakeholders with the information they need and expect (Al-Haddad et al., 
2011). Hence, investigation into the link between corporate governance reform and 
financial reporting quality is an essential issue that is worth investigating both for 
researchers and to assist in investment decisions. After the Gulf War in the early 
1990s, many Middle Eastern countries decided to end their dependence on oil and 
gas as major sources of national income and to diversify their sources of national 
income by considering other sources, especially those related to the financial sector. 
The main interest was in capital markets. Responding to the pressure posed by 
globalization following the global financial crisis, regulators in the Middle East 
region have taken actions that made the financial reporting quality level and 
mechanisms of corporate governance in Middle Eastern exchange markets become 
important elements in the stock markets and business environments. Beginning in 
early 2000, the significance of applying sound corporate governance practices began 
to percolate into the consciousness of regional Middle Eastern regulators and the 
private sector (Koldertsova, 2010). The 2006 stock market crash was particularly 
severe in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council1 and local stock markets fell 
dramatically. While this stock market crash was not triggered by any particular 
corporate scandal (as the cases of Enron or Lehman Brothers in the United States), it 
led regional regulators to reflect on how to make capital markets less prone to 
nervousness and to be less rumor-driven, which in turn led to serious thinking about 
corporate governance. The first corporate governance code in the Middle East region 
                                                          
1 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
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was issued in Oman in 2002. Oman, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were the pioneers in the 
region, developing domestic governance codes in 2002, 2005 and 2006, respectively. 
Following these three countries, the majority of regulators in the region moved to 
establish and adopt high corporate governance standards. Furthermore, the process 
of issuance and, in some cases, revision of specialized standards is continuing in the 
Middle-East region. These corporate governance codes issuance processes and 
corporate governance reform programs, including various amendments to the legal 
provisions, mainly focus on a firm’s FRQ, in particular issues of financial disclosure 
and the transparency of companies. This turned financial reporting into an important 
process that establishes an essential source of information to protect investors by 
providing monitoring and controlling by managers’ and owners’ behaviors, in 
addition to providing information in a system of clarity and transparency.  
 
 
1.3  Problem Statement 
 
In the last three decades, Middle East region countries have witnessed dramatic 
changes in their financial regulations system and accounting associations. The 
majority of accounting bodies in the Middle East were established in the 1970s. 
However, most of them become functional for effective accounting roles only at the 
beginning of the 1990s. For example, in Saudi Arabia the first accounting committee 
was established in 1974 to observe accounting practices, while the Saudi 
Organization for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) was established nearly two 
decades later in 1991. Furthermore, the period of the 1990s witnessed the real 
liberalization of Middle East region stock markets, when firms began to apply 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS), since there were no previously existing standards 
required in the local capital markets. The introduction of these two accounting 
standards (GAAP and IFRS) into the Middle East region business environment 
reflects a realization of the importance of financial reporting quality. Recent 
developments and the reform of the legal and financial system are the most 
important elements that can reduce the agency problem among firms and 
stakeholders. In this way, sound corporate governance reform and development in 
the financial and legal system enhances the quality of both corporate governance and 
financial reporting systems (Al-Shetwi, Ramadili & Chowdury, 2011).  Realization 
of the importance of FRQ in the Middle East region can be seen in the growing 
attention paid to this issue by the regulatory system and accounting bodies, with the 
holding of conferences (e.g. “Disclosure and Transparency in Financial Reporting, 
Qatar 2008”), and studies such as that by Naser and Nuseibeh (2003) entitled: 
“Quality of Financial Reporting: Evidence From the Listed Saudi Non-Financial 
Companies” to enhance the financial reporting quality in the Middle East region.  
 
 
The need to improve corporate governance and FRQ is an important and essential 
requirement in the business environment which has motivated many researchers to 
investigate how corporate governance can mitigate conflicts between managers and 
shareholder (for example: Cohen, Krishnamurthy & Wright, 2004; Liu & Lu, 2007). 
Some researchers were interested in studying the multifaceted influence of corporate 
governance on a variety of variables: the intertwined formula of the financial 
reporting quality; and the multilateral role of both governance and FRQ. As a result, 
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a large number of studies in this area were published (e.g. Beekes, Pope & Young, 
2004;  Bradbury, Mak & Tan, 2006; Cashen, 2011; Sánchez-Ballesta & García-
Meca, 2007; Yeo, Tan, Ho & Chen, 2002). However, unlike other relationships and 
other variables, issues of financial reform and its impact are complex and volatile; it 
is always dynamic because it is influenced by public financial policy and the 
approaches followed by the policy makers. Sound corporate governance 
mechanisms, especially those concerning the board of directors and ownership 
structure, aim to solve the agency problem by increasing the monitoring role that can 
be provided by these mechanisms. A continuous review of the promoted corporate 
governance mechanisms can lead to an enhanced financial reporting system. In other 
words, these reviews and reforms are expected to improve the relationship between 
the board of directors and ownership structure and the firm’s financial reporting 
quality.  
 
 
New insights are provided by the present study because it incorporates the influence 
of the unique features found in Middle Eastern countries, with their monarchical 
systems of government, their oil-based income system and their newly established 
stock markets. The nature of the corporate governance framework and financial 
reporting system in the Middle East therefore differs from the corporate governance 
and financial reporting frameworks found in the advanced economies or in other 
emerging markets. Thus, there are critical research issues not yet investigated by 
previous studies in the field of corporate governance reform and financial reporting 
quality. First, after the 2006 stock market crash, the Asian financial crisis and the 
global trend towards universal application of corporate governance, regulators in the 
Middle Eastern financial markets began to think seriously about how to make 
corporate governance more practical and market-relevant rather than merely 
theoretical. This launched a chain of financial reform programs to protect the 
national economies of the Middle East region and to protect investors and the private 
sector. The unique features of the region, in which a majority of the countries are 
ruled by a monarchy, stock markets are newly established, economies are based on 
oil income and the legal system is based on Islamic principles, provide a challenge 
when adopting and applying CG and financial reporting systems.  Furthermore, they 
raise questions about the capability of theories developed in very different contexts 
to explain the concepts and the relationships in a region that differs so markedly 
from advanced economics or other emerging markets. Previous research has not 
provided an answer to the question of whether the financial reform in the Middle 
Eastern financial markets has, or has not regained investors’ levels of trust by 
providing credible tools to make investment decisions; for example by improving the 
quality of financial reporting. Secondly, the majority of reform programs in Middle 
Eastern countries are either imported standards from developed economies or 
standards from trans-national organizations such as the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), which may raise questions about the 
compatibility of imported standards with the needs of the Middle East business 
environment. Moreover, it is important to discover the effectiveness of these 
standards to achieving the expected level of governance in different Middle Eastern 
countries. Finally, the majority of academic studies in financial reporting, corporate 
governance, and financial reform programs have been conducted in developed 
markets or in some of the strongest emerging markets, which means that the results 
of these studies cannot be generalized to different economic settings. For example, 
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Nahar (2010) investigated the relationship between corporate governance reform and 
financial reporting quality in Malaysia. However, the question remains whether 
those results can be generalized to the Middle East, given the unique features of the 
Middle Eastern region markets.  It is questionable whether the same mechanisms or 
concepts of corporate governance in those countries that have been studied would 
have the same results and effects in other legal and financial environments, 
especially in the Middle Eastern markets. Middle Eastern economies have their own 
characteristics and dynamism, yet very little research on financial reporting quality 
and corporate governance reform in these economies has been conducted thus far. 
Therefore, the question whether corporate governance reform does, or does not, 
improve the quality of financial reporting in the Middle East financial markets is an 
empirical issue that has not yet been answered. This research presents the similarities 
and the differences among selected Middle Eastern countries and the level of the 
effectiveness of corporate governance practices achieved in these countries. Saudi 
Arabia, UAE and Qatar have engaged recently in a CG reform programs that allow 
investigating its efficiency unlike other countries such as Bahrain, Kuwait and 
Yemen which start their reforms after 2010 that affect the ability of examine its 
efficiency. In addition, these countries are the highest economics in the region, oil 
based economies and monarchical regimes that make them a very unique 
environment that can show a new insight.      
 
 
1.4  Research Objectives  
 
The main aim of this study is to investigate the impact of CG reform on the quality 
of financial reporting. To achieve this aim, three objectives were formulated, as set 
out below: 
 
i. To investigate the trend of FRQ in the listed firms of selected Middle 
East countries and to determine whether the FRQ has, or has not, changed 
following the introduction of corporate governance reform programs. 
ii. To examine the relationships between selected elements of corporate 
governance (board of directors) and ownership attributes and the FRQ in 
a sample of listed firms from selected Middle Eastern countries. 
iii. To examine the moderating effect of corporate governance reform on the 
relationship between selected elements of governance (board of directors) 
and ownership attributes and the FRQ in a sample of listed firms from 
selected Middle Eastern countries. 
 
 
1.5  Research Significance and Contributions 
 
The association between corporate governance and financial reporting quality has 
been documented in a number of studies carried out in developed countries (e.g. 
Cohen et al., 2004; Donelson, McInnis & Mergenthaler, 2012). This study 
investigates the role of governance reform programs in improving the quality of 
financial reporting in selected Middle East stock markets which possess several 
unique governance characteristics. The study findings can guide the development of 
governance reform and indicate how to further enhance the quality of financial 
reporting of firms in these countries. The study has developed its own models that 
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link FRQ with five characteristics of boards of directors and two characteristics of 
ownership structure. main boards of directors’ features discussed within GC 
framework in Middle Eastern stock markets are the role duality, board members 
independent, board members financial experiences , BD member multiple 
directorships and  director’s ownership. The existence of the royal family member at 
firms’ BD as a unique feature in the Middle East business environments is expected 
to have a significant impact in such environment. Enhancing the credibility, 
transparency and quality of corporate reporting are the main aims of the middle 
eastern corporate governance reforms which still an empirical question about 
achieves its goal or not. In addition, the efforts in Middle Eastern stock markets to 
attract the institutional investors highlighted the importance of this feature among the 
corporate governance framework. The importance of the results of the current study 
stems from the new insights that are provided in respect of several aspects: 
 
1.  The ability of the reform programs of corporate governance applied in the 
Middle East countries to make a real change in the quality of financial 
reporting while taking into account the unique environment for each of 
the corporate governance systems and financial reporting in these 
countries which have monarchical systems of government, which rely on 
oil as the sole source of national income, and which have recently 
engaged in substantial reforms in their financial systems and economic 
programs. 
 
2.  The study provides new insights into the extent of similarities and 
differences between countries in the Middle East. These insights will help 
the international institutions that publish the rules of corporate 
governance to better understand country-specific features and highlighted 
the most effective mechanisms to be applied in different environments. 
Furthermore, the countries in this region adopt different standards 
regarding financial reports, and the results of this research will add more 
information to keep pace with reform programs in companies with 
different systems of corporate governance standards for their financial 
reports. The results of this study will also enable policy-makers in Middle 
East countries to select more appropriate reform programs of corporate 
governance for their own environment, in addition to enhancing their 
knowledge of the characteristics of the most influential programs of 
corporate governance in the financial environment and business to enable 
them to upgrade corporate governance and financial reporting system in 
their own contexts. 
 
3.  The study will also shed further light on the effectiveness of accounting 
theories, especially agency theory, mainly in the Middle East 
environment and, in particular, to assess the ability of these theories to 
explain the relationship between corporate governance and financial 
reporting in the Middle East environment. In addition, it facilitates a re-
consideration of the relations between the mechanisms of corporate 
governance and financial reporting in the Middle East environment with 
its unique characteristics. 
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1.6  Study Motivation   
 
Financial crises in the Middle East region (for example, in Saudi Arabia in 2006, and 
in UAE in 2008) encouraged most Middle East countries to diversify their sources of 
income and adopted plans for economic and financial reforms. One of the most 
important financial reforms undertaken by Middle East countries over the last ten 
years is corporate governance reform. Corporate governance aims to develop the 
financial system and provide a safe investment environment by providing high 
quality financial reports that can reflect the true status and performance of 
companies. The recent wave of corporate governance reforms in the Middle East 
motivated the researcher to investigate the benefits of those reforms on quality 
financial reporting, as one of the most important anticipated outcomes of these 
reforms. The growing attention paid to CG and FRQ as new issues in the Middle 
East region triggered this study to investigate the relationships between CG, FRQ, 
and financial reforms in selected Middle East stock markets. As corporate 
governance became more widely adopted in the Middle East based on packages 
imported from America, Britain and international institutions (such as the OECD), 
important questions were raised about the suitability of these reforms in the context 
of Middle Eastern countries with unique and very different socio-economic features, 
including oil based economies, monarchical systems, and the prevalence of Islamic, 
Arabic and Bedouin cultures. In most countries of this region, these are among the 
greatest influences on institutional systems (Chahine & Tohmé, 2009; Yom & 
Gause, 2012). Nevertheless, similarities among the Middle Eastern countries raised 
questions about the expected reactions to CG reform, and whether differences and 
similarities occur in response to specific features unique to each country.  
 
 
1.7  Organization of the Thesis 
 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter One provides an overview of the 
background of the study, and sets the problem statement, the study objectives, and 
the importance and significance of the study. Chapter Two reviews the literature 
related to corporate governance, Financial reporting quality, the relationship between 
CG (board of directors and ownership) and FRQ, and  prior research on CG, FRQ, 
and financial reform in Middle East region. Chapter Three discusses the research 
environment regarding CG and FRQ in Middle Eastern countries. Chapter Four 
presents the research hypotheses and methodology, especially the study sample and 
the studied variables, and the measures that were used in this study. Chapter Five 
presents and discusses the study results. Finally, Chapter Six summarizes the study 
findings and provides the major conclusions of the study. 
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1.8  Chapter Summary 
 
In this chapter four main points were discussed: first, the background of the study 
was outlined that clarified the roots of current study; then, the problem statement 
focused more tightly on the specific area of concern in the study and shed light on 
efforts that have been made since the financial crisis and how those efforts will 
affect the FRQ.  This section also clarified the presence of various laws and 
regulatory frameworks that can lead to different results. After that the chapter 
presented the three main research objectives: first, is to examine whether changes 
have occurred in FRQ after CG reform was introduced in the study sample. Second, 
is examine the relationship between characteristics of boards of directors and 
ownership on the one hand, and FRQ on the other hand. Third, is to investigate 
whether any moderation affect can be found in the relationship analyses in objective 
two. Fourth, the significance of the study is discussed, and its implications for 
researchers, the literature, stock markets and investors, and policy makers.  
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